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The researches regarding emission trading and market for water rights have been
rather developed independently in the past few decades. However, a redistribution of
surface rights will alter water quality along the river. Water with different quality also
costs differently. It is therefore the studies of emission trading and market for water
rights should not be separated. In this research, we propose a two-stage integrated
system for water quality and quantity trading. We try to internalize the
inter-externalities that both trading systems cause on each other. This integrated
trading system could increase the aggregate benefits of all water users and at the same
time, maintain the water qualities and minimum instream flows of the river.










針對水量稀少性問題，早期的研究有 Hirshleifer et al. （1960）與
Hatrman and Seastone（1970）提出以兩部水價制度（two-tiered system of
water pricing）改善水資源分配效率問題；近期的研究則有Burness and Quirk
（1979）、Burness and Quirk（1980）、Johnson et al. (1981)、Anderson and
Johnson（1986）、Livingston and Miller（1986）、Hsu and Griffin（1992）、
Griffin and Hsu（1993）與經濟部水資源局（2000）等文，進行水量（水權）
交易市場之效率性以及制度研究。在這類研究上需要特別考量的因素，包







之 APS（ambient-permit system）與 EPS（emission permit system）制度、
Krupnick et al.（1983）所提出之 POS（pollution-offset system）制度、Førsund
and Nævdal（1994）與Klaassen et al.（1994）所提出之ERS制度（exchange-rate








少，就申請人目前所知，僅有 Weber（2001）、Sabbaghi and Spulber（1995）
1 第三者效果指水量移轉造成留川水量以及其他水使用者可用水量降低的效果。
2與 Frisvold and Caswell（1995）三篇。


























假設在一河川沿岸，從上游至下游有 ni ,,1 之取水者與污染排放者















































其中， 0v 為水源處之總水量， iv 為各取水點取水後所需維持之最小留



































































































































iii ebeC ，其中 b=(0.01,0.03,0.02)，河川之轉
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情境一 水質、水量單獨交易 (28.37, 81.63, 10) (55.71, 22.14, 20.0) 6.957 328.679 -321.722
情境二 兩步驟水質水量整合交易 (28.37, 81.63, 10) (93.03, 47.02, 2.58) 6.957 290.115 -283.158
情境三 社會最適 (36, 0, 84) (100, 60, 70) － － -146.395
